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BIB-01 /088 W
---------- 002899
R 141505Z APR 75
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1190
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA
AMEMBASSY BONN
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USNMR SHAPE
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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO
SUBJECT: MBFR: WORKING GROUP MEETING APRIL 9 ON DATA REQUIRING AGREEMENT WITH THE EAST

REF: A) USNATO 1762 DTG 11428Z APR 75; B) STATE 78922; C) USNATO 808 DTG 131802Z FEB 75

SUMMARY: MBFR WORKING ROUP ON APRIL 9 CONSIDERED FIRST DRAFT OF REPORT ON MBFR DATA REQUIRING AGREEMENT WITH THE EAST, FROM MILITARY-TECHNICAL STANDPOINT REF A). UK CLAIMED A MILITARY NEED FOR AGREED STARTING POINT FIGURES FOR BOTH SIDES. UK ALSO WISHED TO BRING INTO WG REPORT IMPLICATIONS FOR DATA EXCHANGE OF SPECIFYING THE COMMON CEILING IN PHASE I. CHAIRMAN STRESSED THAT SPC MADATE LIMITED THE WG STUDY TO THE PRESENT ALLIED NEGOTIATING POSITION. IN LINE WITH SPC WISH THAT WG NOT ASSIGN A HIGH PRIORITY TO THIS STUDY, WG WILL RETURN TO IT IN ONE MONTH.
END SUMMARY
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1. AT APRIL 9 WG MEETING U.S. REP (MOORE) DREW ON THE POINTS CONTAINED IN REF B.

2. CANADIAN REP (BECKETT) SAID U.S. THINKING ON MILITARY NEED FOR

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DATA EXCHANGE WAS SIMILAR TO THE THINKING WHICH HAD BEEN GOING ON IN OTTAWA.

3. SHAPE REP (NEUBROCH) MADE THE COMMENTS, TRANSMITTED LATER IN THIS MESSAGE, WHICH WERE GENERALLY COMPATIBLE WITH U.S. VIES, INCLUDING LACK OF INSISTENCE ON MILITARY NEED FOR AGREEMENT ON PRE-PHASE I STARTING TOTALS, AND CRITICISM OF REPORT'S STRESS ON UNIT REDUCTIONS.

4. UK REP (GERAHTY) MADE COMMENT, ALSO TRANSMITTED LATER IN THIS MEAAAGE, WHICH CLAIMED MILITARY NEED FOR PRIOR AGREEMENT ON PRE-PHASE I STARTING TOTALS, AND WHICH SOUGHT TO BRING INTO WG REPORT IMPLICATIONS FOR DATA EXCHANGE OF SPECIFYING COMMON CEILING LEVEL IN PHASE I. CHAIRMAN (GROUP CAPTAIN SMITH) POINTED OUT THAT THE PRESENT ALLIED POSITION CALLS FOR AGREEMENT ON THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT IN PHASE I, AND NOT AGREEMENT ON A SPECIFIC LEVEL, WHICH IS A PHASE II OBJECTIVE. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE SPC HAD GIVEN TH WG A LIMITED MANDATE, ASKING IT TO EXAMINE ON WHICH DATA, IF ANY, AGREEMENT IS ESSENTIAL WITH THE OTHER SIDE "INRELATION TO VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE PRESENT ALLIED NEGOTIATING POSITION". THUS THE IMPLICATIONS OF SPECIFYING THE COMMON CEILING IN PHASE I WERE BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THIS STUDY. U.S. REP SUPPORTED THE CHAIRMAN.

5. AT CONCLUSION OF THE DISCUSSION, CHAIRMAN SUGGESTED THAT THE WE RETURN TO THIS ISSUE IN ONE MONTH, SINCE SPC HAD NOT CONSIDERED THIS A HIGH PRIORITY TASK. WG AGREED.

6. BEGIN COMMENTS BY SHAPE REP

1. (NC) SHAPE STAFF HAS GREAT DIFFICULTY IN CONSIDERING THIS WORKING PAPER IN ITS PRESENT FORM AS THE BASIS FOR DEVELOPING A MBFR WORKING GROUP PAPER. THERE ARE BASIC PREMISES, EXPRESSED OR SUBSUMED, THROUGHOUT THE PAPER WHICH NEED TO BE REASSED OR JUSTIFIED. THE PARAGRAPHS WHICH FOLLOW INDICATE SHAPE'S PRINCIPAL CONCERNS. IT WILL BE SEEN FROM THE ASPECTS RAISED

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IN THESE PARAGRAPHS THAT THEY ARE FUNDAMENTAL TO THE PAPER AS A WHOLE. AS A CONSEQUENCE NO PARAGRAPH BY PARAGRAPH COMMENTS ARE OFFERED.

2. (NS) DATA.

A. IT IS MISLEADING TO INDICATE THAT THE NATO ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET GROUND MANPOWER COULD BE IN ERROR OVERALL BY AS MUCH AS 10 PCT, AND EVEN MORE MISLEADING TO INDICATE THAT THIS DEGREE OF ERROR ALSO APPLIES TO A FIELD FORMATION STRENGTH, E.G. A TANK ARMY (1).

B. THE PAPER INDICATES THAT FIGURES ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES WITH CONFIDENCE ARE UNLIKELY TO BE AGREED. IT IS NOT YET POSSIBLE

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TO CONFIRM THIS VIEW; ON THE CONTRARY, SUCH CONTACTS ON THE SUBJECT IN NEGOTIATIONS SO FAR TEND TO SHOW THAT NATO FIGURES FOR WP FORCES, INCLUDING SOVIET, ARE NOT FAR OUT (2). SUBJECT TO WP JUSTIFICATION OF THEIR FIGURES, IT WOULD SEEM THAT MAJOR DATA MIGHT WELL BE AGREED.

C. ALTHOUGH IT IS TRUE THAT A SPECIFIC MANPOWER FIGURE COULD NOT BE VERIFIED ABSOLUTELY, THIS IS NOT A REASON TO DISCOUNT NATO'S ABILITY TO COLLATE MANPOWER FIGURES, AT LEAST WITHIN THE CURRENTLY ASSESSED MARGINS FOR NATO INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES. IT IS LIKELY THAT ANY VERIFICATION SYSTEM WOULD IMPROVE SUCH ESTIMATE.

3. (NC) NON-CIRCUMVENTION.

A. THE POINHS MADE AT 2 ABOVE ARE MOST RELEVANT WHEN CONSIDERATION IS GIVEN TO POSSIBLE CIRCUMVENTION OF RESIDUAL FORCE LEVELS. BREACHES OF THE AGREEMENT WIDER THAN THE ERROR IN INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES SHOULD BE DETECTABLE. IT IS NOT CLEAR WHY ANY SUCH BRACHES SHOULD NOT BE CHALLENGED. IT WOULD CLEARLY BE NECESSARY FOR CHALLENGE PURPOSES TO HAVE AGREED RESIDUAL FORCE LEVELS.

(1) AC/276-WP(75)6, PARA 7
(2) AC/276-WP(75)6, PARA 8

B. AGAINST THE ARGUMENT THAT NATO ESTIMATES OF OVERALL AND UNIT FIGURES COULD BE AS MUCH AS 10 PCT IN ERROR (WHICH IS NOT
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AGREED, PARA 2 ABOVE), IT WOULD BE ALL THE MORE NECESSARY TO HAVE AN AGREED RESIDUAL FORCE LEVEL. SUCH AN AGREED FORCE LEVEL WOULD SERVE NOT ONLY AS A DETERRENT TO CIRCUMVENTION BUT MORE SPECIFICALLY AS A BENCHMARK FOR CHALLENGING ANY DETECTED CIRCUMVENTION.

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BIB-01 /088 W
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C. THE PAPER INDICATES THAT ALL THAT IS TECHNICALLY NECESSARY FOR PHASE I IS THAT AGREED WITHDRAWALS SHOULD BE MONITORED. THIS IS AGAINST THE ASSUMPTION THAT IN PHASE I AGREEMENT WOULD BE REACHED FOR SUBSEQUENT REDUCTIONS TO A COMMON CEILING. HOWEVER, AS SHOWN IN PARA 5 BELOW THE DETAILED WAY APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES MIGHT BE EXPRESSED IN THE OUTCOME HAS NOT YET BEEN AGREED WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, STILL LESS WITH THE EAST. THE ALLIANCE TAKES THE POSITION THAT EACH STAGE OF REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE COMPATIBLE WITH UNDIMINISHED MILITARY SECURITY. A NECESSARY BASIS TO DETER CIRCUMVENTION AND CHALLENGE POSSIBLE CIRCUMVENTION WILL BE REQUIRED FOR THE STAGE POST-PHSE I AGREEMENT ON REDUCTIONS AND NON-INCREASES. THIS BASIS CAN ONLY BE AGREED FIGURES FOR THE RELEVANT FORCES INVOLVED.

4. (NC) FORM OF EXPRESSION OF RESIDUAL FORCE LEVELS.

A. IT IS IMPORTANT TO ENSURE THAT NATO HAS COMPLETE FREEDOM OF ACTION AS FAR AS RESTRUCTURING POST-REDUCTION GROUND FORCES
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ARE CONCERNED. THE DEVELOPMENT OF TACTICAL CONCEPTS AND ARMAMENTS REQUIRES THAT CHANGES IN ORGANISATIONAL AND MANNING PRACTICES IN FORMATIONS AND UNITS SHOULD NOT BE INHIBITED. DE FACTO CONSTRAINTS ON THE NUMBERS AND ROLES OF UNITS AND FORMATIONS POST-REDUCTIONS MUST BE AVOIDED AND THE RIGHT TO MAKE CHANGES AS A RESULT OF POSSIBLE FUTURE DEFENCE ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN THE EUROP EAN
NATIONS MUST BE PROTECTED.

B. THE PAPER MENTIONS REDUCTIONS AND RESIDUAL FORCE LEVELS BOTH IN THE FORM OF UNITS AND IN MANPOWER TERMS. ALTHOUGH FOR MONITORING OR VERIFICATION PURPOSES IT WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO NATO FOR WP REDUCTIONS TO BE TAKEN IN UNITS AND FOR THESE TO BE NOTIFIED BY THE WP IN ADVANCE OF REDUCTIONS, CARE MUST BE TAKEN TO ENSURE THAT ANY REDUCTIONS OF NATO FORCES IN THE FORM OF UNITS DO NOT LEAD TO DE FACTO CONSTRAINTS ON NATO'S POST-REDUCTION FORCE STRUCTURE.

5. (NC) PHASE II REDUCTIONS. THE ALLIANCE HAS YET TO AGREE THE DETAIL OF ITS PHASE II PROPOSALS YET THE PAPER MAKES SUPPOSITIONS SUCH AS "IF MANPOWER ALONE WERE TO BE THE BASIS FOR REDUCTIONS

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IN PHASE II...", AND RELATED TO THE LATTER SUPPOSITION HAVE
BEEN RAISED AT PARA 4 ABOVE. AS TO THE FORMER SUPPOSITION, THE
ALLIED AGREED OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS ENVISAGES AN OUTCOME AT
APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES IN THE FORM OF A COMMON
CEILING IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER TAKING INTO ACCOUNT COMBAT
CAPABILITY. IT IS POINTED OUT THAT IF MANPOWER ALONE (1) WERE
TO BE THE BASIS OF PHASE II REDUCTIONS THE RESIDUAL TANK RATIO
WOULD BE OVER 2:1 IN FAVOUR OF THE WP (TAKING ACCOUNT OF
THE SOVIET TANK ARMY REDUCTIONS IN PHASE I). IT IS "IMPORTANT
THAT CONSIDERATIONS IN THE PAPER DO NOT INDICATE THAT EITHER
"MANPOWER ALONE" OR "UNITS" BY THEMSELVES COULD BE ACCEPTABLE
BASES FOR PHASE II REDUCTIONS.

(1) SHAPE HAS ALWAYS MAINTAINED THAT REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE EX-
PRESSED IN THE FORM OF MANPOWER AND TANKS.

END COMMENTS BY SHAPE REP

7. BEGIN COMMENTS BY UK REP

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GENERAL COMMENT

1. WE CANNOT AGREE THIS DRAFT SINCE WE BELIEVE IT MISREPRESENTS
NATO REQUIREMENTS ON THIS ISSUE.

2. WE BELIEVE THAT THE UNDERLYING FAULT OF THIS DRAFT IS THAT
IN PARAGRAPH 2 IT IMPLIES THAT THE ONLY REQUIREMENT FOR AN
EXCHANGE OF DATA IS A TACTICAL NEGOTIATING ONE. THIS IS NOT
IN OUR VIEW TRUE. WE BELIEVE THAT UNLESS AN EXCHANGE OF DATA
PRECEDES A DETAILED MBFR PROPOSAL, IT WILL BE IMPRACTICABLE
FOR NATO ITSELF TO DECIDE EITHER WHAT ACTUAL LEVEL THE COMMON
CEILING IN GROUND FORCES SHOULD BE SET (THE 700,000 FIGURE IS
ONLY AN ILLUSTRATION ONE), OR WHETHER SOME WP UNITS SHOULD BE
INCLUDED WITHIN THE PHASE II REDUCTIONS TO ENSURE THAT THE
COMBAT CAPABILITY FACTOR IS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

3. WE SUGGEST, THEREFORE, THAT PARAGRAPH 2 MUST BE RE-WRITTEN
TO MAKE THE POINT THAT AN EXCHANGE OF DATA IS AN ESSENTIAL MILITARY
REQUISITE BEFORE DETAILED NEGOTIATIONS OF THE TABLED NATO
PROPOSALS STARTS. THE EXCHANGE SHOULD BE ON THE TYPES OF DATA
REFERRED TO IN PARA 2(A) TO (C) OF THE DRAFT, SO THAT NATO CAN
THEN ASSESS THE EXACT FORM ITS DETAILED NEGOTIATION PROPOSALS
SHOULD TAKE (EG LEVEL OF COMMON CEILING; CONTENTS OF PHASE I
REDUCTIONS (IE 15 PCT TO INCLUDE A TANK ARMY OF 68,000 MEN,
OR JUST A TANK ARMY OF 68,000 MEN); AND THE FORM OF PHASE II
REDUCTIONS (EG ALL PERSONNEL OR A MIX OF PERSONNEL AND UNITS,
AND THE ALLOCATION BETWEEN USSR AND NSWP).

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BIB-01 /088 W
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4. THE PAPER CAN THEN GO ON TO SAY THAT PROVIDED THE AGREEMENT IS CONVINED TO PERSONNEL ALONE OR TO PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENTS (BUT NOT UNITS), IT SHOULD BE UNNECESSARY TO EFFECT ANY FURTHER EXCHANGE OF DATA (IE OVER AND ABOVE THE PRE-MBFR MANPOWER STRENGTHS OF US AND USSR GROUND FORCES AND FOR TOTAL NATO AND WP GROUND AND AIR FORCES IN THE NGA MENTIONED IN PARA 2(A) TO (C) OF THE PAPER). THIS WOULD BE SO FOR BOTH PHASES, SINCE THE ACTUAL REDUCTIONS CAN ALWAYS BE CALCULATED FROM THE AGREED START-POINT FIGURES FOR BOTH SIDES, AS CAN THE RESIDUAL FORCE LEVEL AT THE END OF PHASE I; WHILE THE RESIDUAL FORCE LEVEL FOR THE END OF PHSE II WOULD BE THE COMPULSORARY COMMON CEILING FIGURE AGREED UPON IN PHASE I.

5. THE PAPER CAN THEN MAKE THE POINT THAT IT WOULD BE UNNECESSARY TO GET INTO A DATA EXCHANGE ABOUT THE SOVIET TANK ARMY TO BE WITHDRAWN IN PHASE I. IT WOULD BE UP TO THE USSR TO PROVIDE EVIDENCE AS TO WHICH TANK ARMY AND WHICH DIVISIONS WERE TO BE INCLUDED AND FOR NATO TO DECIDE WHETHER OR
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NOT TO ACCEPT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL.

6. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF PHASE II REDUCTIONS WERE TO INCLUDE REDUCTIONS OF FORMED UNITS OF BOTH SIDES TO TAKE THE COMBAT CAPABILITY FACTOR INTO ACCOUNT, THEN IT WOULD PROBABLY BE NECESSARY TO GET INTO A DETAILED EXCHANGE OF DATA TO AGREE WHAT

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UNITS OF BOTH SIDES WERE COMPARABLE. THIS MIGHT INVOLVE AN
EXCHANGE OF MANPOWER AND MAJOR EQUIPMENT ESTABLISHMENTS. IF
THE REDUCTIONS IN GROUND UNITS WERE TO BE MADE BY THE WP SIDE
ONLY, SUCH AN EXCHANGE WOULD PROBABLY BE UNNECESARY.

COMMENTS OF DETAIL ON THE EXISTING DRAFT

7. PARA 4. THE DRAFT FAILS TO RECOGNISE THAT AMONG THE
ALLIED OBJECTIVES IN PHASE I IS COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF
THE COMMON CEILING, IF POSSIBLE AT A SPECIFIED LEVEL. IF
THE LEVEL IS TO BE SPECIFIED THEN CLEARLY WE NEED AGREEMENT
ON IT (IE, THE POST PHASE II FORCE LEVELS) AND EQUALLY
CLEARLY WE NEED TO AGREE WHERE WE ARE STARTING FROM AND THEREFORE
THE OVERALL REDUCTIONS NEEDED ON BOTH SIDES. WITHOUT THIS WE COME
TO THE PROBLEM MENTIONED IN PARA 1- WE ARE TRYING TO GET AN
AGREEMENT WITHOUT KNOWING WHAT IT ENTAILS. WE THINK THIS POINT
MUST BE MADE IN PARA 4. WE SIMPLY DO NOT BELIEVE THAT "THE ACCURACY
OF THESE FIGURES IS NOT GERMANE TO THE PHASE I PROPOSAL" IF
THAT PROPOSAL INCLUDES THE COMMON CEILING.

8. PARA 5.

A. THE SECOND SENTENCE SHOULD STATE THAT USSR WOULD HAVE
TO REVEAL ITS OVERALL STRENGTH AS WELL AS THE TANK ARMY
STRENGTH.

B. VERIFICATION. WE THINK THE LAST PART OF THE PENULTIMATE
SENTENCE IS TOO FLAT. VERIFICATION CAN BE ACHIEVED, OVER
A PERIOD, WITH A FAIR DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE (EG, OUR CURRENT
MANPOWER FIGURES).

9. PARA 9B.

A. WE THINK THE SENTENCE IN LINES 10-14 IS STRANGE.
OF COURESE IT MATTERS IF OUR ASSESSMENTS ARE WRONG AS IT
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WOULD MEAN, IF WE OVERESTIMATED STRNGTHS, THAT WE WERE
BEING UNDULY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE REDUCTIONS, AND VICE
VERSA.

B. WE THINK NATO WOULD HAVE MUCH LESS OBJECTION THAN THE
PACT TO TALKING ABOUT UNITS. MOST SUCH FACTS ABOUT NATO
FORCES ARE A FAIRLY OPEN SECRET.

C. THE PENULTIMATE SENTENCE IS RATHER NONSENSE. WE
WOULDN'T DO SUCH A THING.

10. PARA 13. THE FIFTH SENTENCE IS ONLY PARTLY TRUE. ACCURATE
FIGURES ARE ESSENTIAL ALSO WHEN DEALING WITH THE COMMON
CEILING WHICH CAN ONLY BE EXPRESSED IN MANPOWER TERMS.

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11. PARA 14(A). ADD "EXCEPT FOR THE PURPOSE OF AGREEING ON
A COMMON CEILING WHICH IS A PRIME WESTERN OBJECTION PHASE I".

12. PARA 14B. THE SECOND SENTENCE SEEMS TO ATTACK THE
PRINCIPLE OF THE COMMON CEILING. IT SHOULD BE EXPRESSED
IN A DIFFERENT WAY.

END COMMENTS BY UK REP
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 18 AUG 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 14 APR 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GolinoFR
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975NATO02035
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t197504101/abbrzjje.tel
Line Count: 390
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 8
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: A) USNATO 1762 DTG 11428Z APR 75; B) STATE 78922; C) USNATO 808 DTG 131802Z FEB 75
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GolinoFR
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 08 APR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <08 APR 2003 by BoyleJA>; APPROVED <08 APR 2003 by GolinoFR>
Review Markings:

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Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR: WORKING GROUP MEETING APRIL 9 ON DATA REQUIRING AGREEMENT WITH THE EAST
TAGS: PARM, NATO
To: STATE
SECDEF INFO MBFR VIENNA
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Type: TE
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